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Executive Summary
In its 2018 budget, the Government of Canada 
pledged CDN$85.3 million over five years to support 
an ambitious new intellectual property (IP) strategy, 
including CDN$30 million for the formation 
of a Canadian “patent collective.” This paper 
explores the possible structure and goals of such a 
collective, as well as potential risks and challenges 
of each. It concludes that appreciable technology 
development by Canadian firms is not likely to be 
achieved through the proposed patent collective. 
The paper recommends that the proposed 
Canadian patent collective avoid the acquisition 
and aggregation of patents and instead focus its 
limited resources on three supportive functions 
for Canadian industry: assisting Canadian firms, 
through subsidies or other resource commitments, 
to participate in existing international defensive 
patent networks; encouraging Canadian 
universities and research institutions to focus on 
commercially relevant “translational” research; 
and assessing the potential benefits of facilitating 
patent sharing or pooling arrangements in select 
Canadian industries, and offering administrative 
and infrastructural support for such efforts.  
Introduction
In its 2018 budget, the Government of Canada 
pledged CDN$85.3 million over five years to 
support an ambitious new intellectual property 
strategy “to help Canadians better understand 
and protect intellectual property, and get better 
access to shared intellectual property.”1 Among 
the specific initiatives mentioned in the budget 
is CDN$30 million for the formation of a patent 
1 Government of Canada, Budget 2018: Equality and Growth – A Strong 
Middle Class (2018) at 116 [Budget 2018], online: <www.budget.
gc.ca/2018/home-accueil-en.html>. 
collective.2 This proposal appears to respond to 
recent suggestions that Canada consider the 
establishment of a “sovereign patent fund” (SPF), 
emulating models developed in Japan, South 
Korea, China, Taiwan and France.3 However, the 
structure and goals of these state-operated entities 
vary dramatically,4 ranging from offensive patent 
acquisition, assertion and litigation, to industrial 
promotion and support within national borders. It 
is not clear which of these paths Canada intends to 
tread. While the budget promises that the minister 
of innovation, science and economic development 
will “bring forward the full details of the 
strategy in the coming months,”5 the parameters 
of such a patent collective are still scant.  
The 2018 budget defines a patent collective as 
“a way for firms to share, generate, and license 
or purchase intellectual property. The collective 
approach is intended to help Canadian firms 
ensure a global ‘freedom to operate’, mitigate 
the risk of infringing a patent, and aid in the 
defence of a patent infringement suit.” It further 
explains that the collective “will work with 
Canada’s entrepreneurs to pool patents, so that 
2 Ibid. In addition to the patent collective, the 2018 budget allocates 
CDN$4.5 million to “the creation of an intellectual property 
marketplace...a one-stop, online listing of public sector-owned intellectual 
property available for licensing or sale.” While not the principal subject 
of this paper, it is worth questioning the wisdom of this proposed 
expenditure. Numerous online patent marketplaces already exist (see e.g. 
IAM Market, online: <www.iam-market.com>; ideaconnection, online: 
<www.ideaconnection.com/patents/>; IP Marketplace, online: <www.
ip-marketplace.org/search?type=patent>) and not one has achieved 
overwhelming success. In fact, some of the more prominent efforts in 
this area have failed after the expenditure of large sums. See e.g. Jorge 
L Contreras, “FRAND Market Failure: IPXI’s Standards-Essential Patent 
License Exchange” (2016) 15 Chicago-Kent J Intell Prop 419. Rather than 
spend millions on yet another bespoke online patent marketplace, the 
Canadian government may wish to consider listing relevant Canadian 
patents with one or more existing patent marketplaces at a substantially 
lower cost.
3 See e.g. Warren Clarke, “A Worthwhile Intervention? The Potential 
Role for a Sovereign Patent Fund in Canada” CIGI, New Thinking on 
Innovation Essay Series, 25 April 2017; Warren Clarke & James W 
Hinton, Mobilizing National Innovation Assets: Understanding the 
Role of Sovereign Patent Funds (Waterloo, ON: Centre for Digital 
Entrepreneurship + Economic Performance, 2016); Pierre-Emmanuel 
Moyse, “Towards Increased Innovation: Exploring the Effectiveness of 
Sovereign Patent Funds in Canada” (McGill Faculty of Law, Research 
Seminar 1: Intellectual Property Policy in the Making, CMPL 508,  
7 December 2015); Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse & M Jean-Arpad Français, 
“Sovereign Patent Funds: Is there a Canadian Option?” (McGill Faculty  
of Law, Intellectual Property Policy in the Making, CMPL 508,  
7 December 2015). 
4 See Clarke, supra note 3; Oonagh Fitzgerald, “Understanding the 
Promise and Peril of Sovereign Patent Funds” CIGI, Policy Brief No 102, 
13 April 2017.
5 Budget 2018, supra note 1 at 116.
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small and medium-sized firms have better access 
to the critical intellectual property they need 
to grow their businesses.”6 Unfortunately, these 
“definitions” are not definitions at all. Rather, 
they are broad policy goals for the proposed 
collective. This paper explores some possible 
structures for advancing these policy goals, as 
well as potential risks and challenges of each. This 
paper then asks what mechanisms the collective 
might adopt and how it might best be designed 
to help Canadian industry and entrepreneurs.
Twin Purposes for the 
Collective?
The budget advances two distinct but intertwined 
purposes for the proposed patent collective.  
First, there is a developmental purpose: to enable 
Canadian firms to “share” and “generate” IP, 
and to enable Canadian small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) to have better access 
to IP so that they can grow their businesses, 
presumably through technology development. 
The developmental thrust of the collective 
seems to imply that Canadian firms, especially 
SMEs, need help developing more and better 
IP, and that access to more patents will help 
them do so. Hence, the collective will seek to 
make more IP available to Canadian firms to 
enhance their own IP development efforts.
Second, the collective has a defensive purpose: to 
give Canadian firms freedom to operate, mitigate 
the risk of patent infringement and aid in the 
defence of infringement suits. Here, the assumption 
seems to be that giving Canadian firms access 
to more patents will both prevent their own 
infringement of those patents and enable them to 
use those patents in counterclaims against parties 
that might sue them (for example, defensively). 
In assessing how a patent collective could be 
structured to achieve these twin goals, a few 
questions need to be asked: whose patents will 
be included in the collective, what technologies 
will be covered by these patents, what rights will 
be held by the collective and what rights will be 
6 Ibid.
granted to Canadian firms? Below, the author 
addresses each of these questions in the context of 
the twin goals of the proposed patent collective.
Developmental Use
One of the principal goals of the Canadian patent 
collective is to enhance the technology and IP 
development capabilities of Canadian firms. How 
would a patent collective do this? There are several 
possible approaches that can be considered. 
Direct Commercial Usage  
The most intuitive way to structure a patent 
collective for developmental use would be for 
the collective to acquire rights under patents 
covering technologies useful to Canadian firms 
and then license those rights to the firms that can 
make use of them. For example, if a Norwegian 
firm owns a patented method for conducting 
seismological surveys, the collective could obtain 
a licence to that technology on behalf of Canadian 
firms that could then use it to improve their own 
oil and gas exploration operations. In addition, 
Canadian oilfield equipment manufacturers 
could incorporate that method into their own 
products, thereby improving them and increasing 
sales both within Canada and globally. This 
approach can be called “direct commercial usage” 
of patent rights acquired by the collective.  
While direct commercial usage is, at first glance, 
attractive, there are several reasons that it is 
not likely to be a practical way forward for the 
Canadian patent collective. First, direct commercial 
usage will require the collective to identify and 
choose patents to benefit specific Canadian 
industries. With an initial budget of only  
CDN$30 million, the number of industries will 
necessarily be small, at least in the beginning, 
thus giving the collective a preferential 
character that falls short of the Canada-
wide aspirations laid out in the budget.7
7 Such a selective approach would be closer to the industrial policy 
approaches of Asian economies such as Japan, Taiwan and China, in 
which governmental agencies select key industrial sectors (for example, 
electronics, automotive, solar panels or semiconductors) for support and 
promotion. 
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Second, it will not be easy to find suitable patents 
for direct commercial usage. To the extent that 
foreign firms possess patents that have commercial 
application to the operations or products of 
Canadian firms, the patent-holding firms may 
prefer to sell their own products or services 
embodying the patented technology to Canadian 
firms, rather than enable Canadian firms to do so 
independently. If patent-holding firms are open to 
licensing their patents (rather than selling products 
or services to Canadian firms), then the licensing 
rates are likely to be based on commercial usage 
by Canadian firms. For example, in the seismology 
example, above, if a Canadian oilfield services 
company uses the patented method to generate 
service revenue, then the patent holder would likely 
charge a royalty based on that revenue. Would the 
collective commit to paying ongoing royalties based 
on revenue of particular Canadian companies? 
Doing so would be nothing more than an industrial 
subsidy, which, if the Canadian government 
wished to offer it, could be accomplished more 
directly through governmental loans, grants or tax 
incentives. Of course, ongoing royalty payments 
could be avoided if the patent collective purchased 
the relevant patents outright (rather than licensing 
them from the owners), but it seems unlikely that a 
foreign firm would be willing to part with valuable 
patents that have direct commercial application 
or, if it did, the price would be high (a challenge, 
given the patent collective’s modest budget).
In sum, if commercially valuable patents are 
available for licensing, it is likely that Canadian 
firms already have the opportunity to license 
those patents on an individual negotiated 
basis. Intervention by the proposed patent 
collective might offer nothing more than a 
monetary subsidy to a limited segment of 
Canadian industry, a result that could probably 
be achieved through more direct means.
Facilitating Research 
and Development 
A Canadian collective could also focus on the 
acquisition of patent rights to enable Canadian 
firms to conduct research and development 
(R&D) prior to the launch of commercial 
products and services. There is some evidence 
that the existence of patent rights may 
dampen R&D activity in particular fields, so 
the collective could serve a useful function 
by removing barriers to Canadian R&D.
This approach is attractive for several reasons. 
First, it is likely that obtaining research rights 
under existing patents would be less expensive 
than obtaining rights for commercial exploitation. 
Second, R&D conducted in Canada would primarily 
implicate Canadian patents, as opposed to patents 
across the globe (as the sale of commercial products 
would). Again, this suggests that obtaining a 
Canadian R&D licence would be more affordable 
for the collective than obtaining commercial 
exploitation rights. This being said, it is not clear 
that the acquisition of Canadian R&D rights 
from the holders of Canadian patents would 
add much value to the existing R&D enterprise. 
Unlike the United States, Canada’s patent law 
recognizes a strong “research exemption” that 
permits experimentation and development using 
patented technologies.8 Thus, acquiring these 
rights in Canada may not add much beyond 
what is already permitted under Canadian law.
Technology Transfer  
Another oft-repeated benefit of patent collective 
arrangements is their potential to facilitate the 
beneficial transfer of technology to a target 
country. In theory, this transfer can occur 
through technical education and training, 
capacity building and increased availability of 
technology tools within the country. This rationale, 
however, has the most salience in the context 
of developing countries that lack advanced 
technology resources. It is not particularly 
compelling for an advanced nation such as Canada, 
which already has a sophisticated technology 
infrastructure, a pre-eminent educational system 
and an abundance of technology firms. It is, 
thus, unlikely that technology transfer, as it is 
generally understood, would be a meaningful 
outcome of the proposed patent collective.
Patent Sharing  
In addition to seeking to promote Canadian 
firms’ generation of IP, the 2018 budget states 
that the proposed patent collective should 
also promote the “sharing” of IP by Canadian 
firms. This goal is somewhat different than 
those discussed above. It suggests a structure 
whereby Canadian firms might combine their 
8 See e.g. Merck & Co v Apotex Inc, 2006 FC 524; Micro Chemicals 
Limited et al v Smith Kline & French Inter-American Corporation, [1972] 
SCR 506, 1971 CanLII 180 (SCC).
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own patent holdings for mutual benefit, rather 
than one in which foreign patents are amassed.
The idea of a Canadian patent-sharing network is 
intriguing. One model for such a structure may be 
Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance (COSIA), 
which was formed in 2012 to offer a platform 
for Canadian firms to share information and 
technology relating to oil sands exploitation.9 As 
of this writing, COSIA reports that its 10 member 
companies have shared 936 distinct technologies,10 
although the parameters of that sharing are not 
disclosed. The author suspects that the sharing 
effected through COSIA involves some preliminary 
information exchange regarding technologies of 
interest, rather than the formal conveyance of 
rights in commercially valuable technologies. If 
so, the principal value added by the collaborative 
would simply be making available an organized 
forum for industry participants to convene and 
discuss future business collaboration: valuable but 
probably not transformative, and of the greatest 
benefit in industries already having a critical mass 
of Canadian participants (for example, resource 
extraction and petrochemicals, rather than 
outward-bound technology product markets).
Even so, there is something to be said for 
facilitating interaction, cooperation and technology 
sharing among market participants. If Canada does 
decide to create a platform for these activities, 
it would be well-advised to incorporate metrics 
by which the utilization and performance of 
such a platform can be measured. For example, 
how often the platform is utilized and by what 
types of entities, how much technology is 
shared and what are the tangible results of the 
cooperation? Research has shown that patent-
sharing platforms that lack meaningful indicators 
of success can fail when they cannot demonstrate 
their value to the market or their participants.11
An even greater degree of technology sharing 
could be achieved through patent pools, in which 
9 See COSIA, “About COSIA”, online, <www.cosia.ca/about-cosia>; 
Bassem Awad, “Global Patent Pledges: A Collaborative Mechanism for 
Climate Change Technology” CIGI, CIGI Papers No 81, 27 November 
2015 at 7. 
10 COSIA, supra note 9.
11 See Jorge L Contreras, Bronwyn H Hall & Christian Helmers, Assessing 
the Effectiveness of the Eco-Patent Commons: A Post-mortem Analysis, 
CIGI, CIGI Papers No 161, 20 February 2018 at 17, online: <www.
cigionline.org/publications/assessing-effectiveness-eco-patent-commons-
post-mortem-analysis>.
competitors combine their patent holdings in order 
to eliminate blocking positions and more efficiently 
license their collective rights to the industry.12 To 
avoid antitrust and competition law concerns, 
patent pools are generally structured narrowly 
to include only complementary technologies 
and to exclude technologies that may act as 
substitutes for each other. Thus, at least under 
current legal requirements, industry-wide (not to 
mention economy-wide) patent pools are rare.  
This being said, a Canadian patent collective 
would not need to operate a trans-industrial 
patent pool. Rather, such an organization could 
facilitate the formation of patent pools within 
specific Canadian industries and then act as an 
impartial administrator of such pools, much as 
the MPEG LA and Via Licensing organizations 
do.13 However, this approach begs the question 
whether there are enough Canadian patent 
holders in any given industry to form a pool that 
will have realistic prospects for licensing or that 
will materially benefit firms wishing to enter the 
industry. For example, if the Canadian patent 
collective assembles patents from three Canadian 
geophysical firms, is this enough to enable a new 
SME to enter the field, or will the SME still require 
technology and rights from other (non-Canadian) 
firms that do not participate in the collective? 
Another question is whether Canadian firms will 
themselves be inclined to cooperate with their 
closest geographical competitors in this manner, 
when they have not previously been motivated 
to do so. The likely answers to these questions 
suggest that, while a Canadian patent collective 
may offer some benefits to Canadian firms by 
facilitating the formation and management of 
patent pools, this approach is unlikely to result in 
significant competitive gains for Canadian firms 
across the board. Nevertheless, given the relatively 
modest cost of such facilitation and its potential 
to help at least a few Canadian industries, this 
activity may be worth exploring in more detail.
12 See Richard J Gilbert, “Collective Rights Organizations: A Guide to 
Benefits, Costs and Antitrust Safeguards” in Jorge L Contreras, ed, 
Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Competition, 
Antitrust, and Patents (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2017) ch 8.
13 MPEG LA is a firm based in Denver, Colorado, that acts as the licensing 
agent for several patent pools, covering audio-video compression 
and other standardized technology formats, including the popular 
MP3 and MP4 file formats. See MPEG LA, online: <www.mpegla.
com>. Via Licensing acts as the licensing agent for Wi-Fi, 3G and other 
communications and computing standards. See Via Licensing, online: 
<www.via-corp.com/us/en/index.html>.
5Considerations Regarding a Canadian Patent Collective
Are Universities the Answer?  
It has been suggested that Canadian universities 
may be a viable source of patents for 
commercialization through a vehicle such as the 
patent collective.14 Canadian universities and 
teaching hospitals spend more than CDN$12 
billion annually in R&D, ranking Canada eighth 
out of 16 peer countries in terms of public R&D 
investment.15 But despite these impressive outlays, 
commercializing university technology is difficult 
and fraught with uncertainty, not only in Canada 
but around the world. According to one recent 
report, only 11 percent of the 220 US university 
technology licensing offices turn a profit, and even 
technology juggernauts such as Stanford University 
strike gold only rarely (of 10,000 invention 
disclosures made at Stanford between 1970 and 
2015, only 77 generated more than US$1 million 
in revenue, and only three generated more than 
US$100 million).16 There are several explanations 
for these low figures, including the relatively early 
stage of most university research, the uncertainty of 
its commercial potential and the lack of industrial 
champions behind it. While there is undoubtedly 
valuable commercial technology residing within 
Canada’s pre-eminent research institutions, it is 
unclear how the proposed patent collective would 
unlock the potential of that technology in a manner 
that is more effective than the technology licensing 
efforts that already exist at these institutions. 
Would an omnibus governmental agency be better 
at getting Canadian academic discoveries into 
the stream of commerce than the universities 
that developed the technology? It is hard to see 
how this could be the case. For Canadian (and 
other) firms that wish to commercialize the 
technology developed by Canadian research 
institutions, clear pathways for doing so already 
exist at no additional cost to the government. 
If Canada wishes to support the flow of technology 
from Canadian universities to the private 
sector, then it may instead wish to explore the 
funding of more practical and industry-focused 
14 Karima Bawa, “After Failing to Commercialize, Universities Learn to Set 
Ideas Free” CIGI, New Thinking on Innovation Essay Series, 25 April 
2017 at 73, 76.
15 Conference Board of Canada, “Patents”, online: <www.conferenceboard.
ca/hcp/provincial/innovation/patents.aspx>. 
16 Dave Merrill, Blacki Migliozzi & Susan Decker, “Billions at Stake in 
University Patent Fights”, Bloomberg (24 May 2016), online: <http://
jyelaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/UniveristyPatents.pdf>. 
“translational science” research.17 If socially 
useful and commercially attractive technology 
emerges from Canadian research institutions, 
then its odds of being adopted in commerce could 
be reasonable. Thus, a focus on encouraging the 
development of innovative new technologies 
in the academic sector seems preferable to the 
expenditure of funds on the acquisition of Canadian 
academic patents that have not previously 
attracted the attention of commercial actors.
Defensive Use
Patent litigation, particularly the need to defend 
against patent suits brought by financially 
motivated patent assertion entities (PAEs), has 
been identified as a significant business risk in key 
technology-focused industries.18 Thus, in addition to 
the developmental goals of the proposed Canadian 
patent collective, the 2018 budget describes a series 
of defensive features that the collective may offer 
Canadian firms: freedom to operate, infringement 
risk mitigation and assistance in defending against 
infringement claims.19 These goals aim to address 
two related risks faced by firms in Canada: their 
operations in Canada may infringe Canadian 
patents held by foreign third parties, and the 
products and services that they offer outside 
Canada may infringe third-party patents in the 
countries of sale or use. By acquiring patents 
that might otherwise be asserted, or the right to 
operate under them, the collective could, in theory, 
immunize Canadian firms from some of these risks. 
Today, there are two basic structures in place for 
the collective defensive use of patents: defensive 
aggregation and voluntary pledge communities.
17 For example, in 2011, the US National Institutes of Health formed 
the National Center for the Advancement of Translational Sciences 
(NCATS), an institute-level centre devoted to conducting and funding 
translational research in the biomedical sciences with an initial budget 
of approximately US$600 million. See NCATS, “Past Budgets”, online: 
<https://ncats.nih.gov/about/center/budget/past>. The author served as 
one of the inaugural advisory committee members of NCATS.
18 See e.g. European Commisison, JRC Science for Policy Report: Patent 
Assertion Entities in Europe (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2016); Executive Office of the President, Patent 
Assertion and U.S. Innovation (2013).
19 Budget 2018, supra note 1 at 116.
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Defensive Aggregation  
One collective strategy for the defensive use of 
patents involves the aggregation of numerous 
patents into a single member-based entity, which 
then provides its members the right to operate 
under those patents. This is the model adopted 
by RPX Corporation, established in 2008,20 and 
Allied Security Trust (AST), established in 2007.21 
Although their business models differ (RPX is a 
for-profit, publicly traded company; AST is a non-
profit cooperative), both of these entities approach 
patent aggregation in a similar manner.22 RPX 
explains that “we remove patents — pre-litigation 
and out of active litigation — before they can 
become a costly problem for our clients.”23 The 
company claims that it has acquired more than 
23,000 patents and associated rights since its 
inception and has more than 330 members.24 AST 
claims that it has provided its 30 global members 
with a measure of safety under approximately 
2,500 patents and associated rights, which are 
offered in industry-specific categories (for example, 
mobile, media and internet, advertising and so 
forth).25 Both RPX and AST charge their members 
annual fees: RPX’s have been reported (as of 2014) 
to range from US$85,000 to $7 million,26 and AST’s 
range from US$25,000 to $200,00027 (both based on 
members’ annual revenue). RPX reports that it has 
spent more than US$1.1 billion on the acquisition 
of patent rights through the end of 2017.28
There is a strong argument to be made for the 
defensive benefits of targeted patent aggregation. 
Canadian firms could certainly benefit from licences 
to patents that might otherwise be asserted 
20 RPX Corporation, “The RPX Network”, online: <www.rpxcorp.com/rpx-
network/>.
21 AST, “About Us”, online: <www.ast.com/about-us/asts-mission/>.
22 See generally Andrei Hagiu & David B Yoffie, The New Patent 
Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators, and Super-
Aggregators, (2013) 27:1 J Econ Perspectives 45 at 56–58.
23 RPX Corporation, supra note 20. 
24 Ibid.
25 See Malathi Nayak, “Google, Ford, Others Complete Defensive Patent 
Group Buy”, Bloomberg Law (6 February 2018), online: <www.ast.com/
news_article/google-ford-others-complete-defensive-patent-group-buy/>. 
26 Ryan Davis, “Buying Patents to Thwart ‘Trolls’ is a Tricky Strategy”, 
Law360 (3 November 2014).
27 AST, “The AST Membership Advantage”, online: <www.ast.com/about-
us/be-a-member/>. 
28 RPX Corporation, Annual Report on Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended 
December 31, 2017 at 7.
against them in litigation. It is questionable, 
however, whether it is necessary for Canada to 
embark on the creation of a new defensive patent 
aggregation vehicle when groups such as RPX and 
AST each have a decade or more of experience 
in this complex business. Moreover, with a “war 
chest” of only CDN$30 million, such an aggregator 
would only be able to acquire a small set of rights 
compared to an entity such as RPX. It is possible 
that a Canadian defensive aggregator could 
focus primarily on acquiring Canadian patent 
rights, which would presumably be available 
at a lower price than the global rights generally 
acquired by RPX and AST. But, as noted above, 
Canadian patents are less than half of the story for 
Canadian firms that seek to offer their products 
and services outside Canada. These firms require 
freedom to operate across all major markets, not 
only in Canada. Finally, it is not even clear that 
established defensive aggregators such as RPX will 
continue to enjoy financial success, given patent 
litigation trends in the United States and elsewhere, 
making the establishment of a new aggregator 
particularly risky from a financial standpoint.29
For all of these reasons, the creation of a new 
Canadian-focused defensive patent aggregator 
at this time seems inadvisable. Instead, the 
Canadian government may wish to consider 
allocating some of the funds earmarked for 
its patent collective to enable Canadian firms, 
SMEs in particular, to join existing defensive 
aggregators such as RPX and AST. If the Canadian 
government helped to offset Canadian firms’ 
membership fees in these existing organizations, 
it would enable them to benefit from substantial 
defensive portfolios that are already available, 
rather than venturing into difficult and risky 
waters with a new Canadian aggregation effort.
Defensive Pledge Communities  
In addition to the entity-based patent aggregators 
discussed above, a number of less formal contract-
based defensive patent networks have arisen over 
the past few years. These rely on collective promises 
or “pledges” made by like-minded firms in a more 
or less coordinated manner.30 The most notable 
of these are the Defensive Patent License (DPL) 
29 See e.g. Dan Caplinger, “Falling Income, Revenue Plague RPX”, Motley 
Fool (31 October 2017), online: <www.fool.com/investing/2017/10/31/
falling-income-revenue-plague-rpx.aspx>. 
30 See generally Jorge L Contreras, “Patent Pledges” (2015) 47:3 Ariz St LJ 
543 at 567–68.
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and Google’s License on Transfer (LOT) Network, 
both of which were launched in 2014 and focus on 
the software and high-tech sectors. Each of these 
networks seeks to discourage participants from 
transferring patents to PAEs. Under the DPL, a 
participant pledges not to assert its patents against 
any other DPL participant except defensively (for 
example, in response to a patent infringement suit 
by the other party). Under the LOT agreement, 
each participant agrees that if it transfers a patent 
to a PAE, then every other participant will receive 
a royalty-free licence to that patent. Joining the 
DPL is free; joining the LOT Network requires a 
modest fee of US$1,500 to $20,000. For a variety 
of structural reasons, the DPL has not gained 
significant momentum, whereas the LOT Network, 
as of November 2017, claimed approximately 
180 members and 180,000 pledged patents.31
Defensive patent pledge communities are low-
cost mechanisms for coordinating responses to 
common problems such as the proliferation of PAE 
litigation. The DPL and LOT mechanisms described 
above are open to firms around the world. While 
the government’s desire to provide Canadian 
firms with protection against unwarranted patent 
litigation is admirable, it is not clear that additional 
pledge mechanisms are necessary beyond those 
already in place through programs such as the DPL 
and LOT. A new Canada-specific network could 
potentially address industry sectors that are not 
currently addressed by these existing networks, 
yet the industries represented by these networks 
are clearly those most affected by excess patent 
litigation. Thus, unless there is evidence that 
Canadian industry, outside of high technology, 
suffers from an excess of patent lawsuits, 
investing significant resources in the duplication 
of existing pledge structures would seem to 
be a poor use of funds that is not likely to offer 
meaningful additional benefits to Canadian firms.
Patent Defence Costs 
A final defensive patent mechanism does not 
involve the aggregation of patents or patent 
rights at all but is purely financial in nature. It is a 
defensive cost indemnity arrangement: a program 
whereby the Canadian government could set aside 
funds to defray the costs incurred by Canadian 
31 LOT Network, “The LOT Network Community”, online: <http://lotnet.
com/our-community/#member-list>. For a recent comparison of the DPL 
and LOT structures and features, see Jorge L Contreras, “The Evolving 
Patent Pledge Landscape” CIGI, CIGI Papers No 166, 3 April 2018.
firms in defending against patent infringement 
litigation, either within or outside Canada. As such, 
the program could operate like liability insurance: 
assuming the cost of defending (and settling) 
claims within the scope of coverage (in this case, 
patent infringement).  Establishing such a program 
may have intuitive appeal: by stepping in to help 
Canadian SMEs defend against frivolous patent 
suits, it could neutralize the harmful effects of PAE 
litigation on Canadian industry and innovation.  
Despite its initial appeal, however, such a program 
has significant — and probably fatal — problems. 
First, it would be difficult to assess which patent 
suits such a program should defend. Would it 
apply only to suits brought by PAEs? Would some 
suits by practising/competitive entities also be 
covered? If so, how would these two categories of 
patent holders be differentiated? Second, as is well-
documented in the insurance literature, the ready 
availability of insurance creates a moral hazard: the 
insured will act in a riskier manner if they know 
they will not be directly responsible for the costs 
of their actions. Would the availability of patent 
infringement “insurance” encourage Canadian 
firms to infringe more patents, perhaps in lieu of 
entering into legitimate licence agreements? And 
if the fund covers not only litigation costs, but 
damages and settlement amounts as well, then the 
fund would simply be making a pricey commercial 
subsidy to infringing firms. Third, if an insurance 
fund covered settlement amounts in addition to 
litigation costs, the very existence of the fund 
could make Canadian firms more likely targets 
of infringement claims. That is, a PAE seeking 
quick, but sizeable, infringement settlements 
could be incentivized to target Canadian SMEs 
as sources of settlement funds (unlike SMEs in 
other countries, which might lack the funds to 
pay out significant settlement amounts).32  
32 The emergence of medical malpractice insurance in the United States 
gave rise to similar trends. While it would generally not be profitable to 
sue independent medical practitioners, suing well-insured hospitals and 
medical groups became a cottage industry in many US states, resulting 
in a medical malpractice “crisis” in the 1980s. See e.g. David L Nye et 
al, “The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of Claims 
Data and Insurance Company Finances” (1988) 76 Georgetown LJ 1495. 
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Offensive Use
Unstated in the budget is a third potential use for 
the proposed Canadian patent collective: patent 
enforcement as a revenue generation tool. This 
approach has been taken by some of the foreign 
SPFs on which Canada’s collective might be 
based. Japan’s IP Bridge and France Brevets, for 
example, acquired portfolios of patents and now 
enforce them around the world. These SPFs raise 
revenue (“monetize” their patents) both through 
licensing and litigation.33 Such entities have been 
criticized as “state-funded patent trolls.”34
Is this a direction in which Canada wishes to 
go? Some commentators have suggested that 
Canada should consider such an SPF approach,35 
but if it does, Canada should re-evaluate the 
amount of its commitment to this enterprise. 
According to Warren Clarke, most SPFs have been 
capitalized at levels ranging from CDN$100 to 
$500 million,36 significantly above the CDN$30 
million committed to the Canadian patent 
collective. Patent litigation is expensive,37 as are 
acquisition costs of patents (to enforce a patent, 
ownership is generally required, which is more 
costly than a licence). Thus, it is not clear that, 
even if it so desired, the proposed CDN$30 million 
Canadian patent collective could operate as 
an effective PAE.38 But practicalities aside, as a 
33 See e.g. Clarke & Hinton, supra note 3 at 15–18.
34 Hosuk Lee-Makiyama & Patrick Messerlin, “Sovereign Patent Funds 
(SPFs): Next-generation Trade Defence?” (2014) European Centre for 
International Political Economy Policy Brief No 6/2014 at 1; Moyse, 
supra note 3 at 12–13.
35 See Clarke, supra note 3; Fitzgerald, supra note 4; Moyse, supra note 3.
36 Clarke, supra note 3; Fitzgerald, supra note 4 at 2.
37 Federal Trade Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study 
(2016).
38 One commentator favouring the formation of a Canadian SPF points to 
patents generated by the bankrupt Canadian firm Nortel Networks that 
were acquired by a consortium of foreign firms that are now profiting 
from them, arguing that “[t]hese patents were created by a Canadian 
enterprise and are now generating profits for foreign enterprises. 
It is imperative that Canada starts investing to retain its patents and 
the profits they are capable of generating.” See Moyse, supra note 
3 at 33. However, what Moyse fails to mention is that the Rockstar 
consortium (Apple, RIM, Ericsson, Microsoft and Sony) acquired Nortel’s 
patents for US$4.5 billion, a far cry from the CDN$30 million that the 
government has allocated to the proposed patent collective. It is also 
worth remembering that Canadian firm RIM (now Blackberry) was part 
of the acquiring group. And Blackberry itself has recently come under 
fire for adopting many of the characteristics of a PAE. See e.g. Devin 
Barrie, “Has Blackberry become a ‘patent troll’? Not quite, says Ottawa 
researcher”, Ottawa Citizen (13 April 2018).
policy matter, it would be a mistake for Canada 
to facilitate the creation of yet another PAE in a 
world that is already rife with unproductive patent 
litigation. In addition to the general unpleasantness 
of such an approach, creating a Canadian 
national PAE could have significant negative 
repercussions among Canada’s trading partners39 
and multinationals operating within Canada.
Consumer Access
Notably, the 2018 budget does not indicate 
that the proposed patent collective is intended 
to facilitate consumer access to patented 
technologies such as essential medications. 
It appears, rather, to be directed principally 
to commercial ends and to improving the 
international competitiveness of Canadian firms. 
Thus, the author omits any further consideration 
of the potential distributive and humanitarian 
goals of patent aggregation arrangements.
Conclusion
The Canadian government’s proposed patent 
collective aspires to facilitate the development 
and sharing of IP by Canadian firms, especially 
SMEs, and to provide defensive measures against 
unwarranted patent litigation. While these 
ambitious goals are admirable, it is not clear 
that a patent collective mechanism, particularly 
one that is funded at the proposed level, can 
be effective at achieving all of these goals. The 
development of more and better IP by Canadian 
firms is unlikely to be advanced by the collection 
of third-party patents, except, perhaps, in a few 
selected industries (for example, petrochemicals) 
that could benefit more directly from tax incentive 
or subsidy programs and which are already 
active in global product and technology markets. 
Likewise, the acquisition of Canadian patents 
by a collective is unlikely to foster increased 
39 See Moyse, supra note 3 (“Given the litigious and economically taxing 
environment created by patent trolls or PAEs in the United States, it 
is not unforeseeable that the U.S. government would view such funds 
unfavourably” at 11).
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R&D activity within Canada, as Canadian firms 
already benefit from a generous judicially created 
“research exemption” from patent infringement, 
and Canadian universities, without a far more 
directive governmental R&D initiative and 
concomitant funding, cannot realistically be 
viewed as sources for a large quantity of new 
commercially valuable technology across the 
board. Likewise, from a defensive standpoint, 
it is unlikely that the Canadian government’s 
aggregation of patents on behalf of Canadian firms 
could achieve even a fraction of the defensive 
benefit offered by existing defensive aggregation 
programs such as RPX and AST. And the creation 
of a formal defensive patent pledge network 
among Canadian firms, while potentially useful, 
seems to offer few benefits beyond those already 
available from networks such as the DPL and LOT. 
Finally, Canada’s aggregation of patents for purely 
offensive litigation and monetization purposes is 
not recommended, as such an endeavour would 
not significantly help Canadian industry, could 
strain relations with Canada’s trading partners 
and, given current market trends, is far from 
likely to achieve appreciable financial success.
Accordingly, it is the recommendation of this paper 
that the proposed Canadian patent collective avoid 
the acquisition and aggregation of patents and 
instead focus its limited resources on the following 
three supportive functions for Canadian industry: 
assist Canadian firms, through subsidies or other 
resource commitments, to participate in existing 
international defensive patent networks; encourage 
Canadian universities and research institutions 
to focus on commercially relevant “translational” 
research, and possibly to shift Canadian research 
funding priorities in this direction; and assess the 
potential benefits of facilitating patent sharing or 
pooling arrangements in select Canadian industries, 
and offering administrative and infrastructural 
support for such efforts. It is believed that these 
activities, in support of Canadian innovation and 
industry, would be better suited to the modest 
level of funding currently anticipated for the 
Canadian patent collective and would avoid many 
of the pitfalls of acquiring and accumulating 
patents directly. As such, the Canadian patent 
collective could focus on adding value where 
it is truly needed to achieve collective benefits 
for Canadian industry and technology. 
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